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Book Reviews 
PRACTICAL JUDGING 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION. By Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr. 1 Harvard University Press. 2001. Pp. 186. 
$35.00. 
Brian H. Bix2 
The first question many legal academics may ask upon see-
ing Implementing the Constitution is, "do we really need another 
constitutional law book?" At the same time, the fact that the 
book is by Richard Fallon will offer some reassurance, as he is 
one of our most thoughtful commentators on constitutional is-
sues. This confidence is shown again to be well-placed; the book 
is a useful corrective to the too-strident and too-unworldly dis-
cussions that frequently dominate discussions of the Constitu-
tion. 
In this book, Fallon is the voice of Reason: the advocate of 
common sense and practicality, against both originalism and the 
type of "high principle" advocated by Ronald Dworkin.3 To the 
originalists, he shows how their position, if taken seriously and at 
face value, would be unworkable, or at least highly unattrac-
tive-and that few advocates of originalism are actually that 
dogmatic.4 (pp. 13-25) A purist on originalism matters would 
1. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
2. Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Minne-
sota. 
3. Fallon also rejects, after only quite brief consideration, the "methodological 
pragmatism" sometimes advocated by Judge Richard Posner, under which judges are 
instructed to do whatever is best for the future, unchecked by what courts have decided 
in the past. Richard A Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (1996). 
Fallon asserts, reasonably, that this position, at least when read as radically as it sounds, 
gives insufficient respect for rule-of-law and democratic values. (pp. 132-33) 
4. Fallon also raises the more standard critique of originalism, that it requires an 
impossible application of decisions made in another time and a quite different context to 
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have to reject precedent, even rather entrenched precedent, that 
was contrary to the original meaning of the text, and it is hard to 
find any theorist who advocates that. 5 However, "if nonoriginal-
ist precedent is 'law,' appropriately enforced by the Supreme 
Court and even binding on it, then central premises of original-
ism simply cannot be true." (p. 17) If originalism is not the 
grounds for all judgments of constitutional meaning, then one 
has implicitly admitted that there are principles other than origi-
nal intention (or original understanding/meaning) involved in 
the proper implementation of the Constitution, and the question 
remains of what those other principles are and how we deter-
mine when they apply. All self-labeled "originalists" pick and 
choose, they simply neglect to inform us of the principles they 
are using for their selection. 
To a high principle view, Fallon insists on the importance of 
the judges' role as practical lawyers, trying to find workable solu-
tions to institutional, structural, and political difficulties. (pp. 26-
36) It cannot be the Supreme Court's6 role (simply) to deter-
mine the content of general moral principles like "equality" or 
"due process,'' for it is also the Court's function to implement the 
Constitution. Implementation inevitably involves certain com-
promises and accommodations. (pp. 4-6) Fallon emphasizes 
what everyone knows, but few much talk about (at least in aca-
demic commentaries): that doing constitutional law (in contrast 
to debating it in ivory towers or on talk shows) is largeli about 
what is, over the long run, both workable and acceptable. 
What is more, these accommodations are not just the "prac-
tical" side of high principle (what Fallon sometimes calls "practi-
cal judgments" (p. 6)), but also themselves arguably required by 
certain constitutional (meta-)principles: in particular, the princi-
ple of democracy, and the idea that the Court shares with other 
institutions the duty to implement constitutional values. (pp. 32-
33, 35-36) From both principles, one can derive the view that in 
the problems that face us today. (pp. 13-14) 
5. As Fallon points out, the mere fact that the theory diverges so far from our ac-
tual practices may be a sufficient basis for rejecting originalism as a sensible ideal. (pp. 
24-25) He goes on to argue that a Dworkinian emphasis on principle alone is similarly 
too far from the way we actually do constitutional law. (p. 28) 
6. Fallon's discussion is almost exclusively in terms of the actions and decisions of 
the Supreme Court, and the Justices OP that Court. There is little reference to, or discus-
sion of, the other Federal courts or the state courts. 
7. One obvious exception to the above generalization is Alexander M. Bickel, The 
Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Yale U. Press, 2nd 
ed., 1986), though Bickel arguably ends up being far too cautious, while giving too little 
weight to the importance of principle. 
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cases where reasonable persons can disagree about the meaning 
or application of constitutional provisions, the courts should de-
fer to the interpretations of the Constitution express or implicit 
in the actions of other officials.8 (pp. 40-41, 55) 
These considerations mean that the Court is not necessarily 
wrong when it implements (through its interpretations and doc-
trinal rules) somewhat less than the full meaning of certain con-
stitutional provisions. (p. 6) Similarly, the Court may also be re-
spondin~ correctly on the occasions (examples may include 
Miranda and the libel rule of New York Times v. Sullivan 10) 
when constitutional doctrines are in fact broader than is strictly 
required by the meaning of the constitutional text. (pp. 6-7, 41-
42) To put the same general point a different (and more contro-
versial) way, the Court is bound by an unwritten constitution 
which supplements, mediates, and sometimes modifies the writ-
ten constitution. 11 (pp. 112-26) 
Fallon focuses on the less glamorous aspect of constitutional 
law-doctrinal rules and tests-as perhaps the best example of, 
and argument for, the practical side of implementing constitu-
tional values. (pp. 76-101) Neither originalism nor high-principle 
theories answer or explain the challenges that are involved in 
developing doctrine, challenges that go far beyond questions of 
the meaning of constitutional texts, to considerations of day-to-
day implementation. (pp. 77, 80) The doctrinal tests reflect not 
only reasonable disagreement between the Court and others re-
8. Reasonable disagreement plays a double-edged role in Fallon's view of consti-
tutional theory. As discussed, he thinks that the reality of reasonable disagreement often 
creates a situation warranting judicial deference to other institutions. On the other hand, 
Fallon also cites the phenomenon of reasonable disagreement as a justification for judi-
cial review: that reasonable disagreement creates a need and a role for a deliberative 
non-majoritarian institution. (pp. 9-10) 
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
II. The idea of an "unwritten constitution" means only that there are sources of 
law in constitutional adjudication that cannot be traced to the text of the written constitu-
tion; these sources include precedent and interpretive rules, as well as, more generally, 
past practices and practical considerations. (pp. 111-12, 117-18) 
To the argument that references to an "unwritten constitution" raise problems of le-
gitimacy, Fallon reminds us that written constitutions have their own legitimacy problem. 
(pp. 118-24) While there may have been popular consent to the Constitution at the time 
of its enactment, it is not obvious why later generations, who have not consented to the 
document, should be bound by it. Fallon argues that "the legitimacy of the unwritten 
constitution rests on the same conceptual foundations as that of the written Constitu-
tion": widespread acceptance combined with the reasonable justice of its provisions. (p. 
122) 
456 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:453 
garding constitutional meaning, but also reasonable disagree-
ments among the Justices. 12 (pp. 81-82, 92-95, 106-09) 
Fallon sees judicial interpretation of the Constitution as 
connected to majoritarianism,1 but in a more intricate way than 
John Hart Ely's view that constitutional intergretation must be 
confined to representative-reinforcing rulings. " Fallon's view is 
that the Court has the right to offer-as law-moral positions 
that do not yet have majority support, 15 but these positions must 
be grounded in "norms that can fairly be imputed to a broad, in-
clusive constitutional community," and the Court must be sensi-
tive to the long-term acceptability of its conclusions. 16 (p. 48) 
While there is frequently a temptation to say of constitu-
tional theory books-especially those that stay close to the line 
of description of current practices (more rational reconstruction 
than radical reform)-that they have nothing of interest to tell us 
beyond affirming (apologizing for?) what we already do. Fallon 
avoids this charge by discussing in some detail what his approach 
would have suggested for some of the most controversial recent 
cases-testing his theory and at least occasionally coming to un-
expected conclusions. (pp. 56-74) Most surprising may be 
Fallon's ambivalence and uncertainty about Roe v. Wade. 17 
Fallon does not merely question the reasoning of Roe, a standard 
position (pp. 62-63); he questions whether the Court should have 
reached the result it did, finding that abortion is constitutionally 
12. Fallon thus takes common cause with Cass Sunstein's advocacy of "incom-
pletely theorized agreements."' Cass R. Sunstcin, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 
4-5, 35-61 (1996). (pp. 95, 106-07) 
13. At other times, Fallon seems to want to raise the (democratic) legitimacy of 
judicial review by questioning the (democratic) legitimacy of other forms of decision-
making: "Even legislation ... seldom represents the truly considered judgment of a ma-
jority of the citizenry about the meaning or applicability of ultimate constitutional princi-
ples." (p. 9, footnote omitted) 
14. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard 
U. Press, 1980). 
15. Fallon writes: "The Court can reasonably view itself as having a limited proxy to 
deliberate about constitutional issues on behalf of the people." (p. 52) 
16. Fallon notes that "[tjhis stricture leaves ample space for disagreement and per-
sonal vision. In moving from general principles to concrete specifications and particular 
legal conclusions, a Justice must inevitably make contestable judgments about how the 
community's immanent morality would best be specified." (p. 48) 
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (pp. 61-66). Other cases Fallon considers include Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (pp. 56-60); the recent right-to-die cases, Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and Vacca v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (pp. 
66-69); and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (pp. 69-74). The discussion of 
these cases is, at all times, subtle and well-reasoned, but the conclusions reached are not 
especially novel or surprising, though the defense of the Court's go-slow response in 
Brown (pp. 58-59) is particularly well done. 
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protected. 18 (p. 66) While he accepts that the relevant constitu-
tional provisions cover the decision whether to have an abortion, 
for Fallon this is of course not the end of the analysis. He argues 
that the Court was insufficiently attentive to "concerns of de-
mocratic acceptability ... [and] issues of fair allocation of politi-
cal power. ... " (p. 66) He notes with regret the way that Roe 
has led to a much greater politicization of the judiciary and the 
judicial nomination process. (p. 66) 
The book also does well on the small but significant factors 
that frequently sink other law books: Implementing the Constitu-
tion does not have unnecessary padding (it is a sleek 137 pages, 
excluding the endnotes); and though portions of the book were 
published in law journals previously,19 this book reads nicely as a 
single argument, rather than the sort of cobbling together of dis-
parate pieces that one too often finds in legal academic books. 
I fear that Implementing the Constitution is destined to be 
too little read and too little discussed. That is the usual fate of 
theories that are sensible rather than sensational, tending more 
towards the cautious than the intentionally provocative. How-
ever, those who prefer thoughtfulness to provocation, and rea-
soned analysis to conclusory polemic, are well-advised to begin 
(or, perhaps conclude) their consideration of constitutional the-
ory with Professor Fallon's book. 
18. "Even after all these years, it is still not clear (to me, anyway) what the least bad 
answer in Roe would have been." (p. 66) 
19. Richard H. Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Inter· 
pretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987); Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. 
Rev. 54 (1997); How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 535 (1999). (p. 
x). 
